Two markets. Both growing. But today, one is being reshaped by war. We compared Vietnam and Saudi Arabia across three critical dimensions—with the Strait of Hormuz crisis at the center of the analysis. The results are telling.
1️⃣ Demand Strength: Who Needs Steel More?
🇻🇳 Vietnam: Steady, Broad‑Based, and Self‑Sufficient
Vietnam’s steel demand is driven by public infrastructure (highways, airports, ports) and a recovering property market. The government’s Steel Industry Development Strategy targets crude steel output of 25–26 million tonnes by 2030, with domestic consumption projected to reach 270–280 kg per person. Demand is projected to grow 8–10% in 2026, supported by accelerated public investment.
Crucially, Vietnam aims to meet 80–85% of domestic steel demand from local production by 2030. The country is already the world’s 15th largest steel exporter, and domestic supply is ample enough to keep prices stable—steel prices were largely unchanged in February 2026.
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia: Surging, But Now Facing a Supply Shock
Saudi demand is fueled by giga‑projects (NEOM, Red Sea Project) and Vision 2030 diversification. Steel consumption is expected to rise from 16 million tonnes in 2024 to 24–26 million tonnes by 2040. Growth rates are forecast at 7–8% in 2025 and 9–10% in 2026.
But here’s the critical difference today: Vietnam’s supply chain is intact. Saudi Arabia’s is not.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis has effectively severed the “Steel Silk Road.” With maritime insurers withdrawing war‑risk coverage for the Persian Gulf, freight rates spiking over 30%, and over 280 dry bulk carriers sheltering in ports, Chinese steel exports to the Gulf have ground to a halt . Saudi Arabia, which saw a 41% year‑on‑year increase in Chinese steel imports in 2025 to fuel its giga‑projects, now faces a sudden supply vacuum .
Verdict: Saudi Arabia’s demand is growing faster and more urgently—but its supply chain is in crisis. Vietnam’s demand is steadier, self‑sufficient, and actually reaching buyers.
2️⃣ Policy Risk: Import Duties vs. Geopolitical Disruption
🇻🇳 Vietnam: Active Trade Defender
Vietnam uses trade defense tools aggressively. It has extended anti‑dumping duties on Chinese cold‑rolled steel (4.43–25.22%) through 2030 and launched a review of duties on prestressed steel cable. These measures protect local mills but create uncertainty for importers—especially Chinese suppliers.
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia: Import Substitution, but Now at War
Before the crisis, Saudi policy focused on import substitution, not punitive tariffs. Hadeed is expanding its hot strip mill (2.5 million tonnes/year) to replace imported flat steel, and the Baosteel–Aramco plate project (1.5 million tonnes/year) aims to cover almost all imported plate demand . Saudi Arabia has also imposed anti‑dumping duties on Chinese stainless steel pipes (6.5–24.6%) .
But today, policy risk is no longer about tariffs. It’s about access.
The Strait of Hormuz—through which 59% of Gulf steel imports transit—is now effectively closed . Vessels are diverting or anchoring, and new bookings have been suspended. Saudi buyers who secured Chinese billet at $470–475/t CFR just weeks ago are now unable to receive new shipments . The risk is no longer “will duties rise?” but “can the steel physically arrive?”
Verdict: Vietnam’s policy risk is high but predictable. Saudi Arabia’s risk is sudden, severe, and logistical—imports are effectively frozen until the conflict de‑escalates.
3️⃣ Import Opportunity: Windows Are Open—But One Is Closing Fast
🇻🇳 Vietnam: Still Open, but Narrowing
Vietnam imported 1.52 million tonnes of steel in January 2026, with China supplying 46% of the total. Despite anti‑dumping measures, imports from China were still up 29% year‑on‑year. The window for imports is still open, but local production is ramping up and trade defense measures are tightening.
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia: The Window Is Wide—But Only for Those Who Can Deliver
Before the crisis, Saudi Arabia’s import substitution drive was just beginning. The Hadeed hot strip mill won’t start construction until 2026; the Baosteel–Aramco plate mill is still ramping up . The kingdom remains heavily dependent on imports—and the government’s goal to reduce imports by 50% means the current import window is both real and time‑sensitive.
Today, the opportunity has shifted.
Local producers like Hadeed, Emsteel, and Qatar Steel are scrambling to fill the void left by Chinese exports, but they cannot replace the sheer volume of what was arriving before the crisis . For buyers who can secure steel via alternative routes—west coast Saudi ports (Jeddah) remain accessible, though at higher cost—there is an urgent, immediate need.
But for importers relying on Chinese supply, the window is effectively closed until the strait reopens. Freight costs have risen over 30%, insurance is unavailable, and new bookings are suspended .
Verdict: Vietnam offers steady, predictable import opportunities. Saudi Arabia offers a high‑urgency, high‑premium window—but only for those who can deliver now, and through alternative routes.
💡 Key Takeaway for Buyers
| Dimension | 🇻🇳 Vietnam | 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia |
|---|---|---|
| Demand Strength | ⭐⭐⭐⭐ Steady, self‑sufficient | ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Surging, but supply‑starved |
| Infrastructure Need | Broad‑based, recovery‑driven | Mega‑project‑driven, urgent |
| Policy/Supply Risk | 🟡 High but predictable | 🔴 Severe — imports frozen |
| Import Opportunity | 🟢 Open, but narrowing | 🟡 High premium, urgent need — but only via alternative routes |
Do not treat Vietnam and Saudi Arabia as interchangeable emerging markets.
- In Vietnam, sell what local mills cannot yet produce efficiently, but prepare for active trade defense scrutiny. Your supply chain works. Your buyers will receive steel.
- In Saudi Arabia, if you have steel that can reach the west coast (Jeddah) or is already in transit, sell now. The market is desperate. But if you are waiting for the strait to reopen before shipping, recognize that the window for new orders is effectively closed until the conflict de‑escalates .
- The import window in Saudi Arabia is not closing slowly—it slammed shut on February 28. Only those with alternative routes or existing inventory can participate.